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C
limate change mitigation will cre-
ate new natural resource and supply 
chain opportunities and dilemmas, 
because substantial amounts of raw 
materials will be required to build 
new low-carbon energy devices and 
infrastructure (1). However, despite attempts 
at improved governance and better corpo-
rate management, procurement of many 
mineral and metal resources occurs in areas 
generally acknowledged for mismanage-
ment, remains environmentally capricious, 
and, in some cases, is a source of conflict 
at the sites of resource extraction (2). These 
extractive and smelting industries have thus 
left a legacy in many parts of the world of 
environmental degradation, adverse impacts 
to public health, marginalized communities 
and workers, and biodiversity damage. We 
identify key sustainability challenges with 
practices used in industries that will sup-
ply the metals and minerals—cobalt, copper, 
lithium, cadmium, and rare earth elements 
(REEs)—needed for technologies such as 
photovoltaics, batteries, electric vehicle (EV) 
motors, wind turbines, fuel cells, and nuclear 
reactors. We then propose four holistic rec-
ommendations to make mining and metal 
processing more sustainable and just and to 
make the mining and extractive industries 
more efficient and resilient.
Between 2015 and 2050, the global EV 
stock needs to jump from 1.2 million light-
duty passenger cars to 965 million pas-
senger cars, battery storage capacity needs 
to climb from 0.5 gigawatt-hour (GWh) to 
12,380 GWh, and the amount of installed so-
lar photovoltaic capacity must rise from 223 
GW to more than 7100 GW (3). The materi-
als and metals demanded by a low-carbon 
economy will be immense. (4). One recent 
assessment concluded that expected demand 
for 14 metals—such as copper, cobalt, nickel, 
and lithium—central to the manufacturing of 
renewable energy, EV, fuel cell, and storage 
technologies will grow substantially in the 
next few decades (5). Another study projected 
increases in demand for materials between 
2015 and 2060 of 87,000% for EV batteries, 
1000% for wind power, and 3000% for solar 
cells and photovoltaics (6). Although they are 
only projections and subject to uncertainty, 
the World Bank put it concisely that “the 
clean energy transition will be significantly 
mineral intensive” (7) (see the figure).
Many of the minerals and metals needed 
for low-carbon technologies are considered 
“critical raw materials” or “technologically 
critical elements,” terms meant to capture the 
fact that they are not only of strategic or eco-
nomic importance but also at higher risk of 
supply shortage or price volatility (8). Mining 
can produce grave social risks. A majority of 
the world’s cobalt, used in the most common 
battery chemistries for EVs and stationary 
electricity storage, is mined in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country 
struggling to recover from years of armed 
conflict. There, women and sometimes chil-
dren often work in or around mines for less 
pay or status than their male and adult coun-
terparts, without basic safety equipment. 
Owing to a lack of preventative strategies 
and measures such as drilling with water and 
proper exhaust ventilation, many cobalt min-
ers have extremely high levels of toxic metals 
in their body and remain at perpetual risk of 
developing respiratory illness, heart disease, 
or cancer (see the photo).
In addition, mining frequently results in 
severe environmental impacts and social dis-
location. Moreover, metal production itself is 
energy intensive and difficult to decarbonize. 
Mining for copper, needed for electric wires 
and circuits and thin-film solar cells, and 
mining for lithium, used in batteries, has been 
criticized in Chile for depleting local ground-
water resources across the Atacama Desert, 
destroying fragile ecosystems, and converting 
meadows and lagoons into salt flats. The ex-
traction, crushing, refining, and processing of 
cadmium, a by-product of zinc mining, into 
compounds for rechargeable nickel cadmium 
batteries and thin-film photovoltaic modules 
that use cadmium telluride (CdTe) or cad-
mium sulfide semiconductors can pose risks 
such as groundwater or food contamination 
or worker exposure to hazardous chemi-
cals, especially in the supply chains where 
elemental cadmium exposures are greatest. 
REEs, such as neodymium and the less com-
mon dysprosium, are needed for magnets in 
electric generators in wind turbines and mo-
tors in EVs, control rods for nuclear reactors, 
and the fluid catalysts for shale gas fracking. 
But REE extraction in China has resulted in 
chemical pollution from ammonium sulfate 
and ammonium chloride and tailings pollu-
tion that now threaten rural groundwater 
aquifers as well as rivers and streams. Several 
metals for green technologies are found as 
“companions” to other ores with differential 
value and unsustainable supply chains (9).
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
With these sobering social and environmental 
aspects of current mineral extraction in mind, 
we suggest four policy recommendations.
Diversify mining enterprises for local  
ownership and livelihood dividends
Although large-scale mining is often eco-
nomically efficient, it has limited employ-
ment potential, only set to worsen with the 
recent arrival of fully automated mines. Min-
ing can concentrate occupational hazards as 
well as environmental risk, as demonstrated 
most severely by tailings pond disasters and 
mining wastewater contamination. Even 
where there is relative political stability and 
stricter regulatory regimes in place, there 
can still be serious environmental failures, as 
exemplified by the recent global rise in dam 
failures at settling ponds for mine tailings. 
The level of distrust of extractive industries 
has even led to countrywide moratoria on all 
new mining projects, such as in El Salvador 
and the Philippines.
Traditional labor-intensive mechanisms of 
mining that are possible to undertake with 
less mechanization and without major capital 
investments are called artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM). Although ASM is not 
immune from poor governance or environ-
mental harm, it provides livelihood potential 
for at least 40 million people worldwide, with 
an additional three to five times more people 
indirectly supported by the sector (10). It is 
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also usually more strongly embedded in local 
and national economies than foreign-owned, 
large-scale mining, with a greater level of 
value retained and distributed within the 
country. Diversifying mineral supply chains 
to allow for greater coexistence of small- and 
large-scale operations is needed. Yet, efforts 
to incorporate artisanal miners into the for-
mal economy have often resulted in a scar-
city of permits awarded, exorbitant costs for 
miners to legalize their operations, and ex-
tremely lengthy and bureaucratic processes 
for registration.
Development donors need to focus on 
bottom-up formalization efforts rather than 
merely facilitating government efforts to bet-
ter regulate the sector for increased tax rev-
enues. There needs to be a focus on policies 
that recognize its livelihood potential in areas 
of extreme poverty. Moreover, formalization 
of the sector should focus on creating stron-
ger, more accountable arrangements to drive 
greater value of resource revenues down the 
supply chain to ASM miners to ensure better 
environmental and safety mechanisms and 
expand their access to markets. The recent de-
cision of the London Metals Exchange to have 
a policy of “nondiscrimination” toward ASM 
is a positive sign in this regard. Certain indus-
try actors have demonstrated a commitment 
to, and the benefits of, this type of approach, 
such as Fairphone’s sourcing of the mineral 
columbite-tantalite (coltan) used in mobile 
phones. At the level of government policy, 
ASM has demonstrated its ability to increase 
productivity and mechanize production, even 
in hostile regulatory and governance environ-
ments. More space for and support to ASM 
to pursue this trajectory would enhance its 
capacity to meet the increased demand for 
minerals required in the move toward a low-
carbon future. One place to begin is with the 
redistribution of dormant mining conces-
sions previously granted to (but unused by) 
mining companies so that local ASM opera-
tors can legally work in these locations, as has 
been taking place recently in Tanzania.
Acknowledge the limits of traceability
A great deal of attention has focused on fos-
tering transparency and accountability of 
mineral mining by means of voluntary trace-
ability or even “ethical minerals” schemes. 
International groups, including Amnesty 
International, the United Nations, and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, have all called on mining 
companies to ensure that supply chains are 
not sourced from mines that involve illegal 
labor and/or child labor. In concert, Eur-
asian Resources Group (ERG) launched their 
Clean Cobalt Framework in 2018, First Cobalt 
has their Responsible Cobalt Initiative, RCS 
Global has its Better Cobalt program, Am-
nesty International is working on an Ethical 
Battery framework, and the World Economic 
Forum launched a Global Battery Alliance 
committed to “responsible sourcing” of raw 
materials for batteries.
Traceability schemes, however, may be im-
possible to fully enforce in practice and could, 
in the extreme, merely become an exercise in 
public relations rather than improved gover-
nance and outcomes for miners. In the east-
ern DRC, for example, cassiterite, the mineral 
that tin is extracted from, is exported through 
a traceability system yet can nonetheless have 
contributed to conflict financing or labor and 
human rights abuses while simultaneously 
introducing heavy financial costs onto local 
workers for the right to participate in the sys-
tem (11). Nonetheless, traceability is not with-
out promise, and examples from Blockchain 
technology show how the use of artificial in-
telligence algorithms for data processing has 
the potential for greater assurance but ulti-
mately relies on the accuracy of data being 
fed into the supply chain.
Transparency of supply chains is a means 
to an end and will only be effective if con-
sumers or regulators start to differentiate 
between products being provided. There are 
effective lessons on traceability and transpar-
ency arising from the Kimberley Process for 
conflict diamonds; the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative for oil, gas, and min-
eral resources; and the Fairmined Standard 
for gold that could be applied to the mineral 
supply chains needed for decarbonization. 
Paramount among these is an acknowledg-
ment that traceability schemes offer a largely 
technical solution to profoundly political 
problems and that these political issues can-
not be circumvented or ignored if meaningful 
solutions for workers are to be found. Trace-
ability schemes ultimately will have value if 
the market and consumers trust their au-
thenticity and there are few potential oppor-
tunities for leakage in the system.
Explore new resource streams
Although primary emphasis must be placed 
on resource efficiency (higher output or us-
age of product per unit of resource input) 
and recycling, there will likely be a need 
for primary resource extraction as well 
owing to clean-energy infrastructure de-
mand. New resource streams—including 
metal availability in seawater (desalina-
tion) and groundwater (geothermal brines), 
material substitution or material intensity 
reductions, and materials recovery and 
recycling—also hold promise for diversify-
ing supply chains, as long as they maintain 
environmental sustainability and protect 
worker safety.
Although mining in terrestrial areas is 
likely to continue to meet the demands of 
low-carbon technologies in the nearer term, 
we need to carefully consider mineral sources 
beneath the oceans in the longer term. The 
International Seabed Authority, set up under 
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the 
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Law of the Sea, is in the process of issuing 
regulations related to oceanic mineral extrac-
tion. This process is a rare opportunity to be 
proactive in setting forth science-based envi-
ronmental safeguards for mineral extraction. 
For metals such as cobalt and nickel, ocean 
minerals hold important prospects on the 
continental shelf within states’ exclusive eco-
nomic zones as well as the outer continental 
shelf regions. Within international waters, 
metallic nodules found in the vast Clarion-
Clipperton Zone of the Pacific as well as in 
cobalt and tellurium crusts, which are found 
in seamounts worldwide, provide some of the 
richest deposits of metals for green technolo-
gies. Difficult extraction and declining re-
serves of some terrestrial minerals, as well as 
social resistance against terrestrial mining, 
may lead to oceanic mineral reserves becom-
ing more plausible sources. Minerals near 
hydrothermal vents are in more pristine and 
distinctive ecosystems and should likely re-
main off-limits for mineral extraction for the 
foreseeable future.
Technological substitution can play an im-
portant role as well. Copper offers an illustra-
tive example. Higher copper prices in recent 
years have incentivized replacement in new 
applications in the automotive industry, such 
as wire harnesses and replacing copper with 
aluminum winding in motors. However, sub-
stitution to other primary metals or even syn-
thetics could merely shift resource demand to 
another material that may be more abundant 
initially but can become more challenging 
to procure over time. Moreover, substitution 
may be limited to particular innovations or 
niches. Alternatives to lithium-ion batteries, 
such as sodium-ion batteries, are becoming 
more practical and feasible. But finding sub-
stitutes for metals like platinum group met-
als in key technologies such as fuel cells has 
become increasingly difficult, and reserves 
are dwindling.
Recycling and better resource efficiency 
can play a part at extending and enhancing 
the lifetimes of products and also stretch-
ing out mineral reserves. Closed-loop sup-
ply chains based on circular economy ideas 
in addition to advancements in metallurgy, 
reverse logistics, waste separation, materi-
als science, waste processing, and advanced 
recycling can all enhance the longevity and 
continual reuse of minerals and metals. Re-
searchers at the U.S. National Renewable En-
ergy Laboratory estimate that 65% of the U.S. 
domestic cobalt demand in 2040 could be 
supplied by end-of-life lithium-ion batteries, 
provided a robust take-back and recycling in-
frastructure is in place.
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) 
is a framework that stipulates that produc-
ers are responsible for the entire lifespan of 
a product, including at the end of its useful-
ness. EPR would, in particular, shift respon-
sibility for collecting the valuable resource 
streams and materials inside used electron-
ics from users or waste managers to the com-
panies that produce the devices. EPR holds 
producers responsible for their products at 
the end of their useful life and encourages 
durability, extended product lifetimes, and 
designs that are easy to reuse, repair, or re-
cover materials from. A successful EPR pro-
gram known as PV Cycle has been in place in 
Europe for photovoltaics for about a decade 
and has helped drive a new market in used 
photovoltaics that has seen 30,000 metric 
tons of material recycled. To date, EPR has 
mainly shaped collection, recycling, and 
waste management to ensure safe and re-
sponsible disposal of specific classes of prod-
ucts like e-waste, paint, and pharmaceuticals, 
but, in concept, it is also meant to help drive 
more sustainable design as well as options 
for reuse and repair. There is evidence of 
EPR’s influence on green design in the global 
solar industry. For example, thin-film manu-
facturer First Solar screens new materials to 
ensure that they will not negatively influence 
their recycling process, through which they 
currently recover 90% of their CdTe semicon-
ductor material and 90% of their glass. To 
more easily recycle the plastics and copper 
from photovoltaics, some manufacturers are 
seeking out halogen-free components.
Space mining, although potentially use-
ful for developing lunar and planetary bases 
farther into the future, has less potential for 
meeting the demand for minerals for imme-
diate decarbonization on Earth. A possible 
exception to this may be platinum group 
metals from asteroids, but here, too, the time 
frame and quantity of production would pre-
clude its use in meeting immediate technol-
ogy needs for climate mitigation.
Incorporate minerals into climate  
and energy planning
Given the centrality of minerals and metals 
to the future diffusion of low-carbon technol-
ogies, materials security should be actively 
incorporated into formal climate planning. 
This could be connected to ongoing planning 
as part of the nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) under the Paris Accord, the 
European Commission’s National Energy 
and Climate Plans (NECPs), or even energy 
policy-making at the national scale. Climate 
planners could begin by mapping out their 
NDC contributions alongside a list of “criti-
cal minerals” for energy security (see supple-
mentary materials).
Although care must be taken to ensure 
that the NDC process does not become too 
broad or research intensive, we believe the 
NDCs are the most tangible international 
policy consensus mechanism on this matter. 
The NDCs can incorporate some of the min-
eral sourcing challenges through efforts at 
resource efficiency. The Group of Seven (G7) 
has taken on this linkage, and policies to mo-
tivate resource efficiency can be a means of 
keeping track of material and mineral supply 
chains. For example, a materials assessment 
for particular infrastructure options for cli-
All production data reflect annual production. 2017 data reflect annual production for all uses. 2050 data reflect estimated production for only LCET 
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mate change mitigation or adaptation could 
be included in cost-benefit analyses. Recent 
work has suggested that the social acceptabil-
ity of tying resource-efficient products to cli-
mate change mitigation efforts is strong (12).
Having each country create a list of critical 
minerals within its NDC process and show 
possible trade-offs and shortfalls could lead 
to several benefits. More efforts on national 
critical material analysis could result in im-
proved mapping of mineral supply chains, 
for which there is already a notable gap 
across many developing countries and re-
gions. The analytical efforts would enhance 
our understanding of supply constraints and 
demand patterns, which in turn could lead 
to a better understanding of future prices 
and drivers, especially those beyond the 
control of governments and policy as agents 
of change. The process of mapping mineral 
demands for NDCs, NECPs, and national en-
ergy policies could lead to new linkages and 
networks and a raising of awareness, con-
necting the traditional minerals and met-
als community to other research and social 
communities, especially in climate policy 
and energy studies. In this way, climate miti-
gation could be twinned with minerals secu-
rity and industrial strategy as a way to meet 
broad sets of goals (environmental, political, 
and economic) in one stroke.
AN ETHICAL CONUNDRUM
Mineral and metal supplies are geologically 
determined, yet socially mediated. Even if 
supplies are enhanced through coproducts of 
other industries, new resource streams, and 
considerable expansion of recycling and in-
creased recovery rates, there are likely to be 
bottlenecks across metal supply chains (13). 
This is exacerbated by poorly functioning 
markets, as least for the minor metals. Hence, 
trade policy will need to become more deftly 
aligned with mineral supply in ways which 
are both economically and ecologically more 
efficient. Furthermore, more robust reporting 
and emissions data will be required across 
the supply chain. For example, although the 
U.S. government strategy for mineral supply 
security released in June 2019 highlights the 
importance of trade with allies and partners, 
it does not consider where it is most ecologi-
cally efficient to source minerals. Pursuing 
decarbonization simultaneously with prin-
ciples of a circular economy, coupled with 
increased market transparency mechanisms 
and full life-cycle reporting, could yield im-
portant social and environmental benefits.
Consideration should also be given 
to where mining is most likely to have a 
positive development footprint while also 
having more manageable environmental 
impacts (14). Utilizing tools such as the 
Responsible Mining Index and platforms 
such as the Responsible Minerals Initia-
tive or the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable 
Development may be a way forward. Al-
though there may be treaty fatigue among 
policy-makers, an intertreaty protocol on 
mineral supply chains to ensure that the 
goals of existing treaties are met could en-
hance effective governance. Conversations 
in this vein should be attempted among 
the parties to the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, through the UN 
Environment Assembly, as well as more fo-
cused mechanisms such as the U.S. govern-
ment’s recently launched Energy Resource 
Governance Initiative, the World Bank’s 
Climate-Smart Mining Facility, or the Eu-
ropean Institute of Innovation and Tech-
nology for Raw Materials.
Having just marked the 150th anniversary 
of the formulation of the periodic table, it is 
high time we realize that the elements, and 
the minerals in which they are embedded, 
are essential to our attainment of low-carbon 
goals. There is an ethical conundrum to ad-
dressing climate change only by aggravating 
other social and ecological problems related 
to unsustainable mineral and metal supply 
chains. But done sustainably, an impending 
mining boom could help lift communities out 
of poverty, accelerate technical innovation for 
decarbonization, and further the realization 
of energy and climate targets. Which direc-
tion it takes will depend considerably on how 
metal and mineral supply chains are gov-
erned over the next few critical years. j
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Modified from European Commission. 2017. Third list of critical raw materials for the EU of 2017. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/critical_en.
Countries accounting for the largest share of critical raw materials
